

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001382

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE-JLEVIN, SBALL, EB/TRA-ARADETSKY,  
S/CT-KAGUILAR  
DHS FOR TSA-INTL PROGRAMS-DTIEDGE,  
DHS FOR BTS-RBEARDSWORTH, CCLARK  
ICE FOR FOREIGN OPS DIVISION  
CBP FOR OIA-KTHOMSEN  
BRUSSELS FOR USEU-SCRISTINA AND TSA-RCAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2015

TAGS: [BAIR](#) [PTER](#) [FR](#)

SUBJECT: FRANCE: POSITIVE ON TSA INTERMODAL DIALOGUE, TEPID  
ON SOME EA REQUIREMENTS

REF: A. 04 PARIS 9137

- [1](#)B. 04 STATE 217111
- [1](#)C. 04 PARIS 7092
- [1](#)D. 04 PARIS 5566

Classified By: ECONOMIC MINISTER-COUNSELOR THOMAS J. WHITE,  
EMBASSY PARIS FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: In February 24 meetings with TSA  
International Programs Assistant Administrator David Tiedge,  
French officials

-listened to U.S. concerns about Emergency Amendment  
implementation, agreed to continue discussion, but  
sidestepped new commitments;

-agreed to continue discussions toward a common matrix of  
aviation security measures for flights of interest, and  
requested TSA define a calendar of airport assessments;

-foresaw few significant problems with new TSA restrictions  
regarding cigarette lighters on board aircraft;

-agreed to launch a dialogue with TSA on rail and public  
transport security; and

-reviewed France's global approach to counterterrorism and  
national security.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Tiedge met separately with Air France senior  
executive Guy Tardieu who projected that Air France could  
provide its Master Crew List to the GOF for TSA in a matter  
of weeks. In addition, Tardieu declared that Air France  
needed more French law enforcement support when denying  
boarding to No-Fly passengers and better coordination with  
French border police in order to improve the implementation  
of Selectee and No-Fly Emergency Amendments. He thanked the  
U.S. for no longer subjecting French crew members born  
outside of France to NSEERS secondary screening upon entry  
and said that TSA's upcoming ban of cigarette lighters on  
U.S.-bound flights should not present a significant problem  
for Air France. END SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (SBU) While in Paris to participate in European  
Conference on Civil Aviation (ECAC) meetings, TSA's Assistant  
Administrator for International Programs David Tiedge met  
with a GOF interagency group, which included representatives  
from the Ministries of Interior, Defense and Foreign Affairs,  
chaired by Bernard Boube, Protection and Security Director at  
the General Secretariat of National Defense (SGDN). (NOTE:  
SGDN, under the authority of the office of the Prime  
Minister, coordinates national security policy within the  
ministries and agencies of the GOF. END NOTE.) Tiedge held  
a separate meeting with Guy Tardieu, Chief of Staff to Air  
France (AF) CEO Jean-Cyril Spinetta and discussed operational  
security with France's civil aviation authority (DGAC)  
director for aviation security Yves Meusburger.

SGDN: TSA-GOF Dialogue

[1](#)4. (C) At SGDN, in response to a TSA proposal, Bernard Boube  
agreed that the U.S. and France should quickly launch a  
regular dialogue on security in all modes of transport, going  
beyond aviation to encompass rail and public transit. Tiedge  
said the U.S. was interested in learning about France's  
experience in securing rail and land transport and public  
transit networks. Such a dialogue, he said, would enhance  
the GOF/US close working relationship on these issues and  
give both sides an opportunity to share best practices.

SGDN: Aviation Security, EA Implementation

[1](#)5. (C) Tiedge offered that the U.S. and U.K. had agreed on a  
matrix of aviation security measures for "flights of  
interest" and suggested that TSA continue to work with the  
French civil aviation authority, DGAC (Direction Generale de

l'Aviation Civile), to agree on similar measures for flights departing France for U.S. airspace. Boube explained that the GOF has a catalog of measures in place for flights of interest and would like to continue discussions already begun with TSA (REF D) with a view to finding common ground. Both sides agreed that the 2003 holiday period clearly demonstrated that establishing common aviation security measures in advance of threats to civil aviation is vastly preferable to having to cancel flights for lack of a set of joint incremental security steps to help manage crises.

16. (C) Tiedge asked why French airlines were not carrying out EA requirements on sharing Master Crew Lists, or complying with some notification requirements (to the Transportation Security Intelligence Service, TSIS, for example) in the No-Fly and Selectee EAs, according to the U.S./GOF agreement on alternative proposals for EA implementation (REF B).

17. (C) Boube responded indirectly, saying that U.S./GOF discussions should continue on the matter. He indicated that the U.S. was fully aware that the GOF had a problem with EAs requiring French airlines to contact USG agencies directly and suggested that Selectee procedures in general should eventually refer to a future jointly-agreed catalog of security measures. Boube expressed incredulity at the possibility that the Selectee list could contain tens of thousands of names and said that the challenges the Selectee list is designed to address would be better handled by more intelligence sharing between our experts, rather than by circulating a data-heavy list, which airlines had difficulty manipulating.

18. (SBU) SGDN's Henri Schlienger presented an overview of the GOF's management of aviation security and specifically asked TSA to define a calendar of visits for French airport assessments in advance.

SGDN: GOF Global National Security concept

19. (SBU) In addition to discussing the above issues, French officials also reviewed France's global national security concept explaining the role and powers of the President, the Prime Minister and individual ministers, from threat assessment to planning objectives and readiness drills, to the "Vigipirate" program that implements security measures in the public arena. They pointed out that, as opposed to the U.S. model of regrouping homeland security responsibilities into a single ministry, France's long experience with European conflicts and with terrorism within its boundaries reinforced the GOF's tested method of handling threats to the homeland through intense interministerial cooperation.

DGAC: Operational Aviation Security

10. (SBU) In a separate meeting, Tiedge briefed France's civil aviation authority (DGAC) security director Yves Meusburger on TSA's upcoming ban of cigarette lighters (and potentially matches) on U.S.-bound flights. Meusburger said it should not present a significant problem for DGAC and that when necessary, DGAC would issue a security directive addressing airlines to comply with the restriction for flights departing France for the U.S. Meusburger responded positively to Tiedge's reiteration of U.S. interest in continuing discussions on a common matrix of aviation security measures for flights of interest. When asked why French airlines were not complying with all EA notification requirements, Meusburger indicated that Selectee name match notification to TSIS may be addressed in the future through a DGAC-issued security directive following additional coordination with SGDN and with relevant ministries.

11. (SBU) Tiedge agreed to DGAC's request to conduct a reciprocal security assessment of Air France's (AF) operation at JFK airport and suggested it be coordinated through the TSA office at Embassy Paris. In addition, both DGAC and TSA

SIPDIS

discussed their respective organizational changes.

Air France Efforts

12. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting, Guy Tardieu told Tiedge that AF's Master Crew List could probably be provided to the GOF for transmission to TSA (as agreed to in U.S./French alternative procedures, REF B) in the correct format in "a matter of weeks" following a period of necessary tests. Tardieu allowed that AF still had some difficulty implementing TSA-required No-Fly procedures and the airline had legal concerns about whether the airline had the authority to deny boarding to a someone seeking to board an AF flight on French territory on the basis of a U.S. government recommendation. Generally, he said, GOF directives were sufficient to allow AF to implement EAs but AF needed more support from French Air and Border Police (the PAF - Police de l'Air et des Frontieres).

¶13. (SBU) On the transmission of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data, which Tardieu understands is a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) requirement outside the purview of TSA, Tardieu reported that technical problems persisted with transmitting required PNR data elements to CBP on flights headed for the U.S. The problems stemmed, he said, from separate, unlinked data systems for reservation and departure control systems which are common to all non-U.S. carriers. Tardieu said AF appreciated the time that CBP's technicians already had spent in communications with AF's technical experts and said he believed it was simply a matter of time until technical solutions to transmission problems were in place.

¶14. (SBU) Tardieu thanked the U.S. for no longer subjecting French crew members born outside of France to CBP's National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) secondary screening upon entry and, when Tiedge updated him about new U.S. restrictions on items on-board U.S.-bound flights, said that TSA's upcoming ban of cigarette lighters on U.S.-bound flights should not present a significant problem for Air France.

COMMENT

-----  
¶15. (C) On the details of EA implementation, SGDN's Boube may have kept his comments deliberately vague so as not to commit the GOF to elements not specifically addressed in the U.S.-GOF alternative procedures agreement. The Embassy's regular senior-level interlocutor at SGDN on EA issues -- Deputy Secretary General Scott de Martinville -- was away for the week and unavailable to meet with Tiedge on February 24. It is possible that Boube may not have been apprised of all the features of the EAs or of the agreement. Embassy will seek more information through our regular contacts at SGDN.

¶16. (U) TSA Assistant Administrator David Tiedge cleared this message.  
Leach